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Introduction
For decades, migrant remittances have been a fundamental external source of 
capital for the Turkish economy. Between 1960 and 1981, remittances covered 
about 80 % of the Turkish trade deficit and about 60 % of the current account 
deficit. In these earlier times, Turkey has been one of the top remittance recipi-
ents among all countries.1 Due to the fact that remittances did not lead to an 
inverse outflow of capital by interest payments or other kinds of repayments, 
their impact on the balance of payments was more positive than it was with 
other  monetary  inflows  (such as  foreign direct  investments  [FDI]  or  loans), 
which would have the same effect in purely accounting terms. 
Since the late 1990s, remittances to Turkey have declined sharply. This ar-
ticle evaluates the causes and consequences of the poor performance of aggre-
gate remittances flows to Turkey in the post-1998 era. It presents an overview 
of relations between the changes in remitting behavior since the late 1990s to 
today and the dynamics of Turkish migration from an economic point of view 
and in its historical context. The paper also analyzes the trends in workers’ re-
mittances in the financial crises of 1994, 2000/1 and 2008 and questions the 
transformation of motives behind remitting decisions in the pre- and post-cri-
ses periods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview about the changes of remittances to Turkey in the last decades. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the determinants and the effects of remittances and Section 4 
1 İçduygu (2005 a).
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goes into the reasons behind the declining trend in the remittance flows to 
Turkey after the year 1998. Section 5 concludes.
Remittances to Turkey
It is very well known that a large share of private money transfers is conducted 
via informal channels. This is the case for Turkey as well.2 Consequently, the 
overall dimension of the phenomenon might be underestimated, if only offi-
cial  data  are  considered. Nevertheless, since  estimations  of  informal  remit-
tances are extremely hard to provide, this is a common drawback affecting all 
empirical studies on aggregate remittance flows.3 In the case of Turkey, one of 
the most important data deficiencies is the lack of availability of remittance 
data disaggregated by country of origin. This might increase our understand-
ing of the phenomenon, and be particularly useful to discern, if the fall in re-
mittances is attributable to a different geographic pattern of Turkish emigra-
tion in the last decade compared to the previous ones.
Figure 1 presents the amount of remittances flows to Turkey from 1974 to 
today. The impact of consecutive devaluations in the Turkish economy follow-
ing the oil crisis of 1974 upon the remittances trend in the 1970s is quite visible 
in Figure 1. Two factors  played a role  in the 1980s, namely liberalization in 
trade/finance  following the  military  coup  of  1980  and encouragement  pro-
grams of Western Europe to promote return migration. The 1999 earthquake in 
Turkey and the financial crisis after the mid-1990s had remarkable effects on 
the remittances trend of 1990s and 2000s. Overall, it is sufficient to argue that 
between 1974 and 1988, with some tiny exceptions, the volume of aggregate re-
mittances increased; whereas, there occurred a dramatic decline after 1998. 
2 Officially recorded remittances were greatly surpassed by the "luggage trade" made by migrants to Turkey. Non-recorded 
remittances may have reached six billion USD, surpassing by far the recorded remittances of about 1.2 billion USD; see İç-
duygu (2008).
3 Freund/Spatafora (2008).
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Figure 1: Remittances to Turkey, 1974–2009, Million USD 
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. 
Remittances from citizens living abroad sent to support families and relatives 
back home have been a very important source of capital accumulation for Tur-
key. Before the recent decade, they played an important role in feeding the 
Turkish economy with capital. At that time, the level of remittances was about 
four to six times higher than the level of FDI (see Figure 2). Today, remittances 
still are a significant source for the accumulation of capital; however, due to a 
dramatic increase of FDI, remittances have lost their overall significance and 
reached only one sixth of the level of FDI in the last six years.4
Recently, also remittance outflows from Turkey to the neighborhood have 
become more important. An increasing number of workers from the Black Sea 
area and the Middle East have come to Turkey to get a job that is better paid 
4 While in the times of the “Gastarbeiter” system most of the remittances were either consumed (for buying a car, apart-
ment or house) or invested in trade (bazaar shops) or transportation facilities (taxis), more recently remittances have more 
and more been used to build up construction sites, farms or small manufacturing enterprises. This is especially true for the 
use of Anatolian capital. Companies in Anatolia, such as Kombassan, Büyük Anadolu Holding, Yimpaş, Endüstri, Sayha, Itti-
fak and Jet-Pa, were founded primarily with the savings sent by workers abroad (see Ömer, Acar and Toprak, Anatolian Ti-
gers). Some of the Anatolian Tigers went through legal investigation and it is legally proven that these companies used 
workers’ remittances outside of its collection purposes. It is also very well known that some of these firms have strong links 
with Islamic foundations, media and press. Most of these firms, also named as Islamic capital or green capital, bankrupted 
and were accused of cheating migrants. It is also important to keep in mind that there are also some successful examples 
among Anatolian firms who functioned very efficiently and had no Islamic ties.
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than at home. They remit parts of their income to their family members left 
behind in their  region of  origin. These economic activities have come to be 
known as the “suitcase trade”, due to the fact that not only money but also 
goods of all kinds have been sent back home. Along with the remittances sent 
home from Turkey, a growing number of joint ventures and Turkish FDI into 
the neighborhood have appeared.5
Figure 2: Remittances and FDI to Turkey, 1988–2008, Billion USD
Source: World Bank: Quick Query Database.6
The Determinants and the Effects of Migrants’ Remittances
The level of remittance flows depends on both the migrants’ ability (income 
and the savings from income) and the motivation they have to remit savings 
back to the home country. The propensity to remit depends also on the dura-
tion of migration (whether it is temporary or permanent), the family situation 
of migrants (the partner, children) and the connections they have in the home 
5 Kirişçi/Tocci/Walker (2010, p. 19).
6 “Remittances (R) compared to FDI” means: if value =1, then R = FDI, if >1, then R > FDI: if < 1, then R < FDI.
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(whether migrants move alone or with other family members, and whether 
they keep attachments to those left behind).7 
Why Do Migrants Remit? Some Theoretical Expectations
When looking at the motives that migrants have to remit, no general theory of 
remittances exists, as Stark (1991) highlights. The studies that analyze this topic 
provide descriptive evidence and empirical results that are limited to a certain 
geographical, socio-cultural and temporal context. The literature usually distin-
guishes between pure altruism, pure self-interest  and informal  agreements 
with family members left in the home country and portfolio management de-
cisions. Pure altruism refers to the fact that migrants care about relatives left 
behind and derive utility from the welfare of his/her relatives. The altruistic 
model predicts that the amount of remittances should increase with the mi-
grant’s income8 and decrease with the domestic income of the family. Remit-
tances should also decrease over time: the attachment to the family gradually 
weakens and migrants may decide to settle permanently in the host country 
followed by their family members.9
The second motive for remitting money may be pure self-interest. Mi-
grants may remit money to their parents driven by the aspiration to inherit, if 
it  is  assumed  that  bequests  are  conditioned  by  behavior.  Moreover, remit-
tances could ensure migrants that relatives left behind take care of the assets 
they still own there.10 The intention to return home may further promote re-
mittances for different types of investment (real estate, financial assets, public 
assets, social capital): migrants that experience a “return illusion” are shown to 
remit more than those experiencing a “permanent settlement syndrome”.11 
A  more  eclectic  model  labelled  “tempered  altruism” and  “enlightened 
self-interest” by Lucas and Stark (1985) sets remittances in a family framework 
of decision-making, as a component that is endogenous to the migration pro-
cess. At the household level, to allocate certain members as migrants might 
well represent a Pareto-superior strategy, and remittances represent the mech-
anism for redistributing the gains in terms of both risk-spreading (“implicit co-
7 Munshi (2003).
8 Lucas/Stark (1985).
9 Lowell/de la Garza (2000).
10 Brown (1997).
11 Glytsos (1988, 1997).
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insurance  agreement”)  and  investment  in  the  education  of  young  family 
members (“implicit family loan agreement”).
In the implicit co-insurance model, at the beginning the migrant plays 
the role of the insured while the insurer bears the initial costs of the migration 
project. The potential migrant is hardly expected to be able to cover all the ex-
penses alone. Later on, he might become an insurer for the family members 
back home when he finds secure employment, and has high enough earnings 
to remit.12 By receiving remittances, the family will then have the opportunity 
to improve its consumption, to undertake investment projects including much 
more risk and thus reach a higher level of utility. In the loan agreement model, 
remittances are assumed to be the repayment of an informal and implicit loan 
contracted by the migrant for investment in education and migration costs. In 
a second stage, remittances become loans made by migrants to young relatives 
in order to finance their education until they are themselves ready to migrate. 
Finally, in the third stage, before returning to the country of origin, migrants 
use remittances to invest in assets at home. Later, the next generation of emi-
grants repay the loan to the former emigrant lenders, who may have retired in 
the  home  country.  Given  the  nature  of  the  loan,  remittances  cannot  con-
sequently be reduced over time – as the co-insurance or altruistic theories pre-
dict – and are mainly used for consumption purposes. 
Migrants could also have a saving target; thus, they want to return home 
with a certain amount of savings. Remittances are part of a bargaining process 
between the migrant and the family left at home. The claim of the family on a 
migrants’ income can be considered as the demand side and the ability of the 
migrant to remit  (income and savings) represents the supply side for remit-
tances. The migrant wants  to  reach the saving target  and to minimize  the 
drain from his income, be it in the form of consumption expenses in the host 
country or remittances to the family. The family, on the other hand, wants its 
income to be larger than that of the neighbors in order to justify the decision 
to send some family members abroad. In this set-up, the amount of money re-
mitted depends on the migrant’s income, the per capita income in the home 
country and the bargaining power of the two sides. The remittance behavior 
might be different whether migrants move for permanent settlement or just 
temporarily. Incentives to remit could be higher for temporary migrants13 since 
12 Lucas/Stark (1985).
13 Galor/Stark (1990).
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the attachment to the home country declines over time.14 On the other hand, 
the longer the time spent in the host country, the higher the wages, so in prin-
ciple migrants could have the chance to remit more, if interested. Lucas points 
out that remittances may initially rise, and then decline with duration of stay, 
which “would suggest an optimal length of stay to maximize remittance flows, 
balancing greater earning power against diminishing attachment”.15
All the models mentioned so far refer to the individual motives to remit 
rather than to macroeconomic dynamics of these flows, which certainly reflect 
individual decisions at an aggregate level. Anyway, there might be some mac-
roeconomic factors, both in the host and home country, which may signifi-
cantly affect the size of remittances. Part of migrants’ savings may be remitted 
for reasons of relative profitability of savings/investing in the home country, 
and  can be  explained  in  the  framework  of  a  portfolio  management  choice 
where relative macroeconomic factors in the host and home country play a 
key role: among the others, interest rates, exchange rates, inflation and relative 
rates of return on different financial and real assets.
Taking this into account, governments of migrant-sending countries used 
to implement incentives schemes (i. e., premium exchange rates, foreign ex-
change deposits with higher returns, etc.) in order to attract remittances, but 
they were not really successful. As far as Turkey is considered, empirical ana-
lyses for the period 1963–1982 show that neither variations in exchange rates 
(reflecting the  will  to  attract  remittances  by  premium  exchange  rates), nor 
changes  in  the  real  interest  rates  (reflecting the  intention  to  attract  remit-
tances by foreign exchange deposits with higher interest rates) seemed to sig-
nificantly  affect  the  size  of  remittance  flows.  Remittances  towards  Turkey 
were much more affected by the prospect of political stability rather than actu-
al economic returns.16
It should be rather clear that these different hypotheses concerning re-
mittance behavior are not mutually exclusive since some or all of them could 
work at the same time and the predominant element might change between 
periods and individuals. A universal framework therefore is the challenging 
task to be reached.17
14 Merkle/Zimmermann (1992).
15 Lucas (2004, p. 13).
16 Straubhaar (1986).
17 El-Sakka/McNabb (1999).
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The different hypotheses attempting to explain remittance motivations – 
pure altruism, pure self-interest, implicit family agreements, the migrant’s sav-
ing  target  and  portfolio  management  decisions  –  complement  each  other. 
Some or all of these motives together may simultaneously drive remittances, 
each one explaining a part of the amount remitted or a period of remitting 
practice. One  motive  can  predominate  over  the  other  for  a  period  or  for  a 
sample of migrants with the same characteristics, and their roles can be inter-
changed. This illustrates that the remittance phenomenon is a very complex 
one, and explains the difficulty in developing a universal theory of remittance 
determination. A very important recent assumption regarding the contribu-
tion of remittances in compensating the human capital loss of migrant-send-
ing countries is that migrants’ propensity to remit diminishes with education. 
There is little empirical work regarding this issue (an exception is Faini [2002]), 
but if confirmed by future research, the results would be outstanding. It would 
imply that high-skilled workers do not compensate (or compensate less)  for 
the loss they induce to the economy they are leaving.
Which Effects from Remittance Inflows?
The literature about the impact of remittances in receiving countries is recent, 
but it has grown rapidly in the last years. Most of the analyses focus on three 
main issues. The first topic discussed is the direct impact of remittances on in-
come distribution, poverty alleviation and individual welfare. 
Migrant remittances unquestionably produce welfare effects in develop-
ing countries such as poverty alleviation, education and health improvements. 
At the national level, several studies18 show that even if the impact on poverty 
incidence is small, the reduction in the severity of poverty, measured by the 
poverty gap, is substantial. Many families that receive remittances are still be-
low the poverty line, but their income level is  much closer to the threshold 
than what it would be otherwise. Remittances contribute to increase house-
holds’ disposable income, relaxing liquidity constraints; this can sort positive 
effects on educational choices for children. Yang (2008) considers the increase 
in remittance flows received by Philippine households after the appreciation 
of foreign currencies against the Philippine peso due to the 1997 Asian finan-
cial crisis. These positive income shocks enhance human capital accumulation, 
raising schooling enrollment rates and reducing therefore child labor. Cox, Ed-
18 See Adams (2004) for Guatemala and Taylor et al. (2005) for Mexico.
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wards and Ureta (2003)  find that  remittances have a  significant  impact  on 
school retention while other studies on the Mexican case19 document that re-
mittances are associated with substantial  health improvements, namely re-
duction in infant mortality and increase in birth weight.
Empirical contributions on the income distribution effects of remittances 
mainly use the Gini index and results are mixed. Although some scholars20 
found confirmation that remittances have an equalizing effect on income dis-
tribution, other studies  show that remittances  increase inequality as meas-
ured by the  Gini  coefficient.21 As a matter  of  fact, wealthier  families, being 
more able to pay for the costs associated with international migration, may 
also be those who benefit the most from migrants’ remittances. By means of a 
dynamic model of rural  income distribution in two Mexican villages, Stark, 
Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986, 1988) similarly found that the distribution effect of 
remittances depends ultimately on the migration history, and on the degree to 
which migration opportunities are distributed across households. When the 
migration  process  begins, information  about  destinations  and  employment 
possibilities is still limited and only wealthier households can afford to send 
migrants abroad. Consequently, wealthier families are the first to benefit from 
remittances, causing income inequality to rise. Later, as the chance to migrate 
spreads over a greater range of income classes, poorer households can benefit 
from remittances, too, and there is an equalizing effect on income distribution. 
Clearly, to evaluate the overall effect of remittances on income distribu-
tion there are some factors to be taken into account: the level of  initial  in-
equality can vary according to the different environments, and disparities in 
results may be caused by differences in the empirical methods applied.22 
The  second  part of the literature discusses the effects of remittances on 
the  economy  as  a  whole, and  specifically  the  impact  on  employment, pro-
ductivity and growth.  While there is little doubt concerning the positive mi-
croeconomic effects  deriving from remittances, the mechanisms behind the 
macroeconomic consequences for the receiving countries are more complex. 
The magnitude of  the development impact of  remittances was assumed by 
19 Hildebrandt/McKenzie (2005), Duryea et al. (2005), Lopez Cordova (2005).
20 Taylor/Wyatt (1996), Taylor (1999).
21 Adams (1991), Rodriguez (1998), Adams (1998).
22 Rapoport/Docquier (2005).
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many scholars to crucially depend on how this money was spent: consump-
tion, housing, purchasing of land, financial saving or productive investment. 
To the extent that remittances are channelled into investments, they can 
directly affect employment and growth on a long-term basis. Inflows of work-
ers’ remittances add to domestic sources of income to finance capital accumu-
lation and, at the same time, they can contribute to lowering the cost of capital 
in developing economies via an improvement of the creditworthiness of do-
mestic investors (collateral function). Glytsos (2002) for example shows that in-
vestments rise thanks to remittances in six out of the seven Mediterranean 
countries in his sample. In the same line, Leon-Ledesma and Piracha (2001) find 
a positive effect of remittances (through investments again) on productivity 
and employment for eleven transition economies in the period 1990–1999.23 
When remittances are used to fund consumption expenditures, short-run 
effects  on  economic  output  depend  on  different  factors:  purchased  goods 
might be produced in the country, but also imported from abroad; moreover, 
an unexploited national productive capacity is needed to fulfill the increase in 
the internal demand of goods deriving from a higher household purchasing 
power.24 One remittance dollar spent on basic needs may stimulate retail sales, 
which stimulate further demand for goods and services, which then stimulates 
output and employment.25 In this line of reasoning, remittances might repre-
sent a possible offset to the decline in output as a result of emigration.26 In the 
case  of  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries,  Straubhaar  and  Wolburg 
(1999) showed that remittances do not compensate the welfare loss due to the 
emigration of the high-skilled workers to Germany. 
The short-run impact of remittances on aggregate output has been esti-
mated through a simple Keynesian multiplier effect. Glytsos (1993) calculates a 
remittance multiplier of around 1.77 in gross output for Greece,27 while the es-
23 See also Drinkwater et al. (2003).
24 When the demand deriving from remittances falls on non-tradable goods, and the economy cannot meet this demand, 
remittances may generate an inflationary effect. The price for agricultural land in Egypt rose by 600 % between 1980 and 
1986 due to remittances (Adams [1991]). 
25 Lowell/de la Garza (2000).
26 Quibria (1997) shows that if low-skilled migrants emigrate, and remittances are in excess of the domestic income loss, 
then the welfare of the source country rises. If, on the other hand, migrants are high-skilled workers and/or if emigration is  
accompanied by capital, remittances have a welfare-increasing effect for the non-migrants only when the capital/labor ra-
tio remains unchanged or rises in the country of origin. If the capital/labor ratio falls, the welfare effect is indeterminate or 
even negative.
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timated value is around 3.2 for Mexico.28 Ratha (2003) estimates that every re-
mittance dollar spent in Mexico increased GNP by 2.69 USD in the case of urban 
households and by 3.17 USD in the case of rural households. 
A further channel through which remittances may affect growth is the 
labor force participation of recipient households. Chami et al. (2005) underline 
that remittances take place in a context of asymmetric information due to the 
long distances between migrants and recipients. Therefore, remitters do not 
have the chance to monitor the final use remittances are destined to and mor-
al hazard problems could induce recipients to decrease either their labor effort 
or the participation in the labor force, diverting additional income to the con-
sumption of leisure.29 Using panel methods on a sample of 113 countries, they 
show that a change in the remittance/GDP ratio is negatively related to eco-
nomic growth confirming that the moral hazard problems in the use of remit-
tances are severe. Clearly, in this context higher growth rates in developing 
countries might stimulate more conspicuous remittance flows. Therefore, the 
endogeneity of remittances needs to be addressed and the subsequent literat-
ure dealt with this problem showing contrasting results. 
In two cross-section studies conducted by the IMF (2005) and Faini (2006) 
the coefficient on the remittance-to-GDP ratio in the growth regressions was 
positive but statistically insignificant. Acosta et al. (2008) instead analyzed a 
panel of 67 countries in the period 1991–2005 and found that remittances have 
a positive albeit modest influence on economic growth. These positive results 
were also confirmed through the studies on Latin American and Caribbean 
countries by Ramirez and Sharma (2008) and Mundaca (2009).
Other studies showed that, on average, remittances have either no signi-
ficant influence on growth or, when significant, their effects are positive but 
very limited in magnitude.30 However, things change when remittances are 
considered together with other determinants of economic growth: if interact-
ed with a measure for financial development31 or with indicators for the qual-
27 It is interesting to highlight the result that spending on consumption and investment produced similar multipliers of re-
spectively, 1.8 and 1.9 in Greece. And contrary to common opinion, expenditure on housing was found to be very productive,  
with a multiplier of 2.
28 Adelman/Taylor (1990).
29 Gapen et al. (2006) using a dynamic general equilibrium model with remittances show that these flows reduce labor 
supply and lead to greater output volatility.
30Giuliano/Ruiz Arranz (2009), Catrinescu et al. (2009).
31 Giuliano/Ruiz Arranz (2009), Mundaca (2009).
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ity of institutions32 in the second one, remittances prove to contribute signifi-
cantly and positively to economic growth.
The third part deals with the contribution of remittances to the balance 
of payments. If remittances are a further income for the receiving household at 
a microeconomic level, they also represent an addition to the receipt side of 
the balance of payments at an aggregate level, giving a substantial contribute 
to ease crucial restraints imposed on the economic growth of developing coun-
tries. Remittances might help to offset chronic deficits by reducing the short-
age of foreign exchange. When compared to other monetary inflows, i. e., fi-
nancial aids, direct investments or loans, they show numerous positive aspects 
because their use is not linked to specific investment projects with high-im-
port content, they bear no interest and do not have to be repaid. In addition, re-
mittances are more stable than other private capital flows as a source of for-
eign exchange and empirically it has been proven that in some specific cases 
they exhibit an anti-cyclical behavior.33
However, as mentioned before, this positive effect on the balance of pay-
ments may also come together with additional imports (and/or adverse infla-
tion effects), if the additional demand induced by remittances cannot be met 
by expanding domestic output. Thus, a “boomerang effect” might occur in the 
case that remittances induce an increase of imports and trade balance deficits 
in the receiving country. Evidence shows that in Southern European countries 
the effect was small and remittance-induced imports between 1960 and 1981 
accounted for 1 % in Spain and Italy, 4.9 % in Greece and 6.2 % in Portugal.34 
The demand for imported tradable goods stimulated by remittances can 
also  lead  to  an  appreciation of  the  real  exchange rate. This  latter  aspect  is 
linked to the so-called “Dutch Disease” effect. A large inflow of capital, be it in 
the form of foreign aid or remittances, might cause an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, with negative consequences for the tradable sector in terms of 
international competitiveness (exports on foreign markets become more ex-
pensive while imports on the domestic market become cheaper).35 Rajan and 
Subramanian  (2005),  however,  give  evidence  that  private-to-private  flows 
(hence remittances), unlike aid inflows, do not have systematic adverse effects 
32 Catrinescu et al. (2009), Calderón et al. (2008).
33 Straubhaar (1988), Buch et al. (2002), Buch/Kuckulenz (2004).
34 Glytsos (1993), Straubhaar (1988).
35 Amuedo-Dorantes/Pozo (2004), Lopez et al. (2007), Lartey et al. (2008).
Causes and Consequences of the Downturn in Financial Remittances to Turkey 145
on external competitiveness and empirical evidence from Egypt, Portugal and 
Turkey, although supporting such fears showed that the “Dutch Disease” effect 
remained marginal in most of the cases.36
Some Empirical Evidence for Turkey
The existing empirical evidence for the determinants of migrants’ remittances 
to Turkey can be categorized into two groups. 
The  first  group  of studies is  focused on macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic determinants of remittances to Turkey. Van Delan et al. (2005) empiri-
cally examine the micro determinants of remittances and the effect of remit-
tances  on emigration intentions  in  a multi-country study including Turkey, 
Morocco and Egypt. It is shown in this 2005 study that, in all three countries, 
family ties and the net earnings potential of emigrants have stronger effects in 
the receipt of remittances than net earnings potential  of households in the 
country of origin. They also conclude that the receipt of remittances has a posi-
tive effect on emigration intentions of household members living in the coun-
try  of  origin. With  reference  to  the  motives  behind remittances, this  study 
states  that  altruism  and  self-interest  play  equally  crucial  roles  as  driving 
forces. Analyzing the determinants of emigrants’ remittances from Germany 
to Turkey over the period 1963–1982, Straubhaar (1986)  showed that flows of 
remittances towards Turkey have been attracted by the emigrants’ confidence 
in the stability of the Turkish government much more than by governmental 
incentives to attract remittances. It is argued that remittances towards Turkey 
are determined by the wage level in Germany and by the confidence the Turk-
ish emigrants felt in the safety and liquidity of their investments in the coun-
try of origin. According to this study, neither interest rate nor exchange rate 
differentials between the host and home countries have an effect on remit-
tances. Examining the macroeconomic determinants of remittances to Turkey 
by using time-series methods over the period 1992–2003,  Alper (2005) shows 
that interest rate, price level, income and exchange rate are the main macro-
economic variables behind remitting behavior. It is also presented in the same 
study that, in the long run, investment motive is effective whereas consump-
tion smoothing plays a role in the short run with respect to workers’ remitting 
behavior. Aydaş et al. (2004) assess the macroeconomic determinants of remit-
tances in the case of Turkey using an OLS estimate for two periods, 1965–1993 
36 McCormick/Wahba (2004), Straubhaar (1988).
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and 1979–1993, and conclude that black market premium, interest rate differ-
ential, inflation rate, growth, both home and host country incomes and periods 
of military regime significantly affect remittance flows. Köksal (2006) under-
lines the importance of Turkish commercial banks and the Central Bank of Re-
public of Turkey (CBRT) in attracting the remittances to Turkey in her paper 
analyzing the significance of financial infrastructure, which is rarely touched 
upon in the literature focusing on Turkey, as one of macro determinants of re-
mittance  behavior.  Akkoyunlu and  Siliverstovs  (2007) analyze  the influence 
that workers’ remittances might exert on migration decisions via co-integra-
tion analysis for the 1964–2004 period. Their study shows the significance of 
remittances in explaining migration in the short  and long run. In his  work 
analyzing the determinants of return migration of Turkish immigrants in Ger-
many, Kirdar (2005) finds that immigrants with a higher savings potential are 
more likely to return.
The second group  of studies is centered on the cyclical characteristics of 
remittances.  Sayan (2004) evaluates the business cycle properties of Turkish 
workers’ remittances. Based on the official data set provided by the CBRT, Say-
an (2004) constructs a data set based on several assumptions and weights and 
concludes that remittances are procyclical with the GDP in Turkey and acyclic-
al with the German GNI (Gross National Income). In a related paper, Erdem-Yiğit 
(2005) presents that the cycles of the Turkish workers’ remittances are pro-cy-
clical against Turkish business cycles and acyclical against German business 
cycles. Sayan (2006) analyzes the behavior of workers’ remittances flows over 
their respective business cycles. His study covers twelve developing countries 
over the period 1976–2003 and results for Turkey show acyclical behavior of 
aggregate inflows of remittances. When looking specifically at the remittances 
from Turkish workers in Germany, Sayan (2006) claims that remittances are 
countercyclical  from  1987  to  1994  and  then  they  become  procyclical.  This 
change in the author’s view is mainly due to the financial crisis that has nega-
tively affected the level of migrants’ confidence in the home country. In the work 
of  Sayan and Tekin-Koru (2007), it is shown again that  remittances sent from 
Germany appear to be procyclical  with the Turkish output. They follow the 
business cycle in Turkey by a lag of  one quarter. Remittances then amplify 
business cycle fluctuations rather than smoothing them. No significant corre-
lation  is  found  between  remittances  and  German  output.  Using  Deutsche 
Bundesbank data for the period 1962–2004,  Akkoyunlu and Khodolin (2006) 
provide contrasting results and state that the remittances of Turkish workers 
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in Germany positively respond to the changes in the German output and do 
not react at all to the changes in Turkish output. 
It can be said that remittances did not turn into employment-creating in-
vestments yet failed to create positive externalities in terms of productivity. 
The strong desire to do self-employed work and to become a kind of an inde-
pendent economic actor caused a considerable proportion of savings to be in-
vested in small  enterprises in the service sector in Turkey. Opening a small 
trading or service business, or buying a van or taxi, was expected to lay the 
foundation for an independent livelihood. The new service firms and work-
shops therefore began to compete with those already in existence, but this did 
not lead to a structural improvement in the sense of driving out inefficient 
firms. On the contrary, it fostered a kind of “bazaar capitalism” of barely viable, 
marginal firms condemned in the long run to incur debt or to go under.
Investment by workers’ societies was an exception. In 1966 Turks work-
ing in Germany had formed workers’ societies so that they could invest their 
savings jointly in industrialization projects rather than individually in the ser-
vice sector. As they were not motivated solely by expectations of short-term 
profits but looked more to the maximization of benefits over the long term 
(such as ensuring permanent jobs for their members upon their return to their 
native region), these societies invested their funds mainly in underdeveloped 
industries and regions (such as Central and Eastern Anatolia, where more than 
half of the societies invested). Their overall contribution to industrial develop-
ment was minor. The small plants producing only for regional needs were of 
limited  potential  and  their  orientation  towards  the  local  structural  set-up 
ruled out any expansion in their activities from the very outset.
Thus, the effects in terms of economic development remained rather lim-
ited. Instead, remittances financed Turkey’s current account deficit to a certain 
extent, while increasing the import capacity. Hence, most of the studies dis-
cuss these limited effects and prove the non-productive aspects of remittance 
flows. Karagöz (2006) applies a time series regression in order to empirically 
prove the negative impact of remittance flows on economic growth over the 
period  1970–2005.  Köksal  (2006)  highlights  the  inflationary  effects  and the 
negative influence of remittances on the exchange rate of the Turkish Lira in 
line with macroeconomic studies that analyze the so-called Dutch disease ef-
fect deriving from remittances.37 Among the incentives that the Turkish Gov-
37 Amuedo-Dorantes/Pozo (2004), Lopez et al. (2007), Lartey et al. (2008).
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ernment used to channel remittances to productive economic activities, one 
can list special import privileges, premium exchange rates and high interest 
rates for foreign currency accounts in the CBRT. Additionally, in the late 1960s, 
three development projects took place so as to channel remittances towards in-
vestment  and  employment, the  village-development  co-operatives, workers’ 
joint stock companies and the State Bank for Industry and Migrant Investment 
(DESIYAB). All of these attempts failed to be successful in the long term due to 
various reasons, which were deeply discussed in the literature.38 
However, one contribution departs from this dominant pessimistic view 
concerning economic consequences deriving from remittances.  Koç and Onan 
(2004) in their study on international migrants’ remittances and the welfare 
status of the left-behind families in Turkey, based on a 1996 Turkish Interna-
tional Migration Survey (TIMS-96), show that remittances are mainly used by 
households in order to improve their standard of living and to therefore con-
tribute to reduce poverty and inequality. This approach is along the same lines 
as de Haas (2005), who underlines the inaccuracy of the idea that remittances 
are predominantly spent on excessive consumption and criticizes the inclina-
tion to denote expenditure on housing, health care, food and schooling as un-
productive and non-developmental. De Haas (2005) argues that the impact of 
migration tends to be highly differentiated across time and space.
Finally, the ECORYS (2006) report on improving the efficiency of workers’ 
remittances devotes one of its sections to the transfers from Germany to Tur-
key. According to this report, the falling trend of remittances to Turkey can be 
explained by two factors: the declining number of Turkish migrants (the de-
clining number of remitters) and the weaker attachment of third- and fourth-
generation migrants to the homeland. For İçduygu (2005 b), the declining trend 
of remittances in the first years of the 2000s can be explained through the eco-
nomic downturn in host countries like Germany that has led to unemploy-
ment among Turkish emigrants and settlement of Turkish emigrants in the 
host  countries,  which  means  they  send  less  money  home.  According  to 
Karagöz (2006), a  decrease  in  the  workers’ remittance  flow  since  the  early 
2000s  can  be  explained  through  the  demographic  change  in  Turkish  emi-
grants’ sociological structure and their entrepreneurial skills (which cause the 
drop in investment-oriented remittances). Aydaş (2005) also analyzes the drop 
in the remittance flow in 1999 (the year of the earthquake) and sees it as evi-
38 See Yüksel (1982), Köksal (2006), Güven (1977), Tatar et al. (1989), Ersun et al. (1997), Martin (1991).
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dence showing the dominance of the investment motive (rather than the al-
truism motive) as the possible reason behind remitting. According to Avcı and 
Kirişçi (2008), falling emigration and the permanent settlement of migrants 
are  the  main  reasons  behind  the  shrinking  amount  of  remittances.  Erzan 
(2009) in his paper estimating the direction and magnitude of the global eco-
nomic crisis  on remittances (including Turkey), concludes that the EU slow-
down, which will reduce the financial capacity of immigrants, will dominate 
over the increased need for funds at home, curtailing the remittances received 
by developing countries. Erzan (2009) argues that the magnitude of this de-
cline may differ considerably across countries due to the fact that the impact 
of growth at home and in the host country on remittances had been changing 
over time.
The Dramatic Drop of Remittances to Turkey in the Post-1998 Era
Permanent Residency in the Host Country and Loss of “Return” Idea
The  change  in  the  demographical  structure  in  the  Turkish  population  in 
Europe is one the most important determinants of declining remittance flows 
to Turkey, according to ECORYS (2006) and Avcı and Kirişçi (2008). The rela-
tively declining pattern of a migrant population of Turkish origin may be ex-
plained by the increasing legal restrictions on migration flows generally con-
sidered, and specifically on flows from Turkey in some cases, i. e.,  Germany. 
These restrictions could force migrants to abandon their plans for temporary 
migration and to stay on a  long-term basis  because of  the increasing diffi-
culties in being readmitted in the host country. It is possible to observe that 
long-term migrants with a Turkish background gradually lose the dream of re-
turning eventually to their homeland. This automatically translates into weak-
er ties of the second and third generation of migrants with the country of ori-
gin. The link between the intention to return and the amount of money sent 
home is rather obvious. When planning to go back, migrants consider their 
home country as the center of their economic interests and are inclined to re-
mit instead of investing money in the host country. In our case, the remitting 
behavior of  first-generation migrants  backed up with the “return to  Turkey 
with the family” dream has lately dissolved and has not been pursued by the 
new generations that are progressively turning into permanent residents (and 
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in some case, citizens) of their host country. Reform in the German Nationality 
Law in 1999 (which came into force in 2000) also played an important role in 
the amount of remittances to Turkey due to the naturalization of Turkish mi-
grants. The new law, to a certain extent, made it easier for migrants residing in 
Germany on a long-term basis  (eight years with permanent  residence)  and 
also for the children of migrants to acquire German citizenship. 
Change in Socio-economic Status: the Second and Third Generations as 
Entrepreneurs Investing in Their Own Business
As migrant entrepreneurship literature showed us, the majority of Turkish mi-
grants are self-employed, and instead of remitting in Turkey, their savings are 
channeled  towards  local  business  in  the  host  country. According  to  Micro-
census 2007, among the self-employed persons with a migration background 
in Germany the largest group of the entrepreneurs is represented by Turks. In 
early 2000s, only in Germany, there were more than 50,000 businessmen of 
Turkish origin providing jobs to over 250,000 persons.
Invisible/Informal Channels: Islamic Foundations and the Corruption of 
Money Invested by Turkish Migrants
The 1990s were a scene of organizational grouping of Turkish migrants under 
various Islamic groups some of which with extreme religious tendencies. Dif-
ferently from the first two decades of Turkish migration to Europe, religion as a 
founding element of  migrant identity became politicized for  the first  time. 
This religious uprising was in parallel with the internal political developments 
of Turkey and most of these organized foundations were representatives or 
foreign branches of already-existing Turkish head offices. By the late 2000s, 
both German and Turkish governments increased supervision measures not 
only on the political activities of these foundations but also on their budgets. 
Due to  the lack of  data on the amount of  money siphoned away from the 
Muslim community in Europe, it  is  difficult  to judge its  role  in the general 
dropping tendency of post-1998 remittances behavior. However, it is acknowl-
edged that some parts of Muslim migrants’ savings were used and corrupted 
under the name of “donation” via these foundations. Hence, migrants who vo-
luntarily  supported  these  unions  financially  spared  some  percent  of  their 
money for “mutual aids/solidarity funds” instead of remitting. However, it is 
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important to keep in mind that these religious oriented migrant networks ex-
plain only some part of informal channeling.
Change in Calculations
Some parts of the decline in remittances, especially the sharp declines in the 
early 2000s, are due to the change in the calculation/classification of remit-
tances  by the CBRT. Before 2003, workers’ remittances  included three main 
items; namely, foreign exchange remittances converted into Turkish Lira, Turk-
ish Lira conversion from foreign exchange accounts of Turkish citizens living 
abroad and money they spent during their visit in Turkey. In 2003, the CBRT in-
troduced a new method and reclassified the last two items of workers’ remit-
tances under tourism revenues. However, under the new classification, these 
data do not allow us to see these two items separately under the tourism rev-
enues item. Hence, it is impossible to distinguish the real impact of the new 
calculation method in the drop of remittances.
In the case of Turkey, in which tourism is one of the leading economic 
sectors, receiving the tourism incentives from state is very crucial for entre-
preneurs. This new method of classification artificially shows a tourism hump, 
so that the political environment for lobbying for incentive-receiving for tour-
ism activities is eased. In 1992, remittances data became monthly. 
Drop in Interest Rate and Rise in Tax
Turkish commercial banks and the CBRT have been playing a crucial role for at-
tracting the remittances to Turkey.
There exist two types of foreign currency bank accounts in which Turkish 
workers living abroad can open with the CBRT so as to deposit their savings, 
namely the foreign currency deposit account with credit letter (FXA) and the 
super foreign currency account (SFXA).39 The crucial aspect of these accounts 
(introduced in 2011) for the scope of this study is the interest rate that is paid 
39 Individuals eligible for opening Foreign Currency Deposit Accounts with a Credit Letter and Super FX Accounts are real  
persons over eighteen years of age having residence or working permits abroad or the right thereto as Citizens of The Re-
public of Turkey (possessing The Republic of Turkey Identity Card/passports) or possessing “Certificates Regarding the Use 
of Rights Under the Law No. 5203”. Persons authorized to work abroad for a long term by the public agencies and those 
employed at the representative offices and bureaus abroad of the public and private sector organizations are also entitled 
to open these accounts. Citizens having a Credit Letter and Super FX Accounts may continue their accounts under the pre-
vailing legislation also after their final return to Turkey. Please visit http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng/ for detailed informa-
tion on these accounts.
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by the CBRT and the amount of tax that is deducted from the overall interest 
rate payment. Figure 3 presents three indicators; namely, the interest rate on 
FXA as a percentage, the interest rate in SFXA as a percentage and the amount 
of tax deducted from the interest payment on FXA and SFXA in total in million 
euro terms (one-year time deposit account).
As it is presented in Figure 3, there is a declining trend in the interest rate 
and an increasing trend in the volume of tax. These two opposing trends give 
us a hint about the dramatic drop of aggregate remittance flows by the end of 
1990s. With respect to FXA, the main drop in the interest rate after a steady 
state since 1994 is  in 2001, the year of the global financial crises. Following 
years witness a drop of almost 1 % each year. A similar trend is applied to the 
SFXA over the period 2001–2004, when the interest rate fell from 9 % to 3 %. 
Figure 3: Interest Rate (%) and Tax (Million Euro) for FXA and SFX40
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.
Thus, Turkish migrant workers gradually faced lower interest rates and higher 
tax ratios, which contributed to the decrease in remittances. 
40 The reason behind the reaching of the blue line (Tax on FXA and SFX in million Euro) is the lack of data after 2005.
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Figure 4: Tax Applied to Remittances, 1987–2004, Percentage Change
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.
These noticeable declines were not the sole determinants strengthening the 
negative incentive of workers’ remitting behavior. As it is clearly shown in Fig-
ure 4, the pattern of tax volume that is deducted from the total interest pay-
ments both to FX and SFX accounts has been an increasing trend since the 
early 1990s. The distinct vault right after the year 1998 is worth mentioning.
At this juncture, it is also crucial to ask whether the Turkish workers’ re-
mittances have shifted away from the accounts in the CBRT to German or re-
lated European financial institutions. In order to shed light on this question, 
Figure 5 compares the interest rates of the CBRT, Turkish banks, German gov-
ernment bonds, LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and EURIBOR (Euro In-
terbank Offered Rate) – (one-year time deposit account). It can be easily fol-
lowed from Figure 5 that the CBRT interest rate on FXA and SFXA is above the 
other Turkish banks, German government bonds, LIBOR and EURIBOR in all 
periods. Hence, there was no interest rate advantage for workers to remit their 
savings  into  better  paying  options,  neither  in  Germany  nor  in  the  rest  of 
Europe. Yet, remittances still did fall and possibly shifted to non-financial in-
struments.41
41 It is crucial to underline the importance of the double taxation issue of Turkish workers’ remittances in the case of Ger-
many. Since the interest rate is considered as an income, at the end of fiscal year, migrants are obliged to declare the 
amount of income that they received due to remitting in Turkey and taxed according to German laws. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Interest Rates Applied to Remittances, Percentage
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.
Shift to the Euro in the EU and Crisis in Europe
By 2002, the shift of EU to the common currency, the Euro, had both positive 
and negative impacts on various macroeconomic indicators. It is agreed upon 
in the literature that for most of the cases, the impact of the new currency on 
the consumers’ purchasing power, especially of migrants as the most vulner-
able group, was negative. Particularly in the transition period (1999–2002), the 
impact on the cost of living was unbearable and this had a negative impact on 
the savings of migrants, which caused a decline in the remittances potential. 
This negative effect has been even more aggravated by the economic down-
turn in Germany and crisis in the EU area in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Crises in 1994, 2000/1 and 2008/09 
The crises that took place in 1994 and 2000/1 were deeply different from the 
one in 2008 due to their causes and characteristics. These differences are obvi-
ous and normal when one takes into account the different economic conjunc-
tures of  time periods. The 1994 and 2000/1  crises  were financial  in  nature, 
whereas the 2008 crisis hit the non-financial sector the most.
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The 1994 crisis was a result of a high-risk premium of private banks un-
der a lack of enough supervision of the financial sector. Yet, due to the high fra-
gility of the banking system, Turkish economy ended up with a liquidity and 
foreign exchange bottleneck.
Figure 6: Remitting Behavior in Crisis Periods, 1992–2009, Monthly Million USD
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.
The 2000/1  crisis  were  the  financial  crises  that  originated  from the fragile 
structure of the Turkish banking system. In November 2000, the crisis dam-
aged state banks most due to the increasing size of “duty loss” accumulation 
and the necessity to finance them by short-term domestic bank liabilities. In 
February 2001, private banks were hit hardest because of their sensitivity to ex-
change rate risk.
In the post-2003 period, the Turkish economy followed a “high interest 
rate-low exchange rate-cheap import-high external indebtedness” policy. This 
policy carried the Turkish economy to a real economy crisis in 2008. Another 
major distinction between the 2008 crises and the previous two is about the 
duration of them. The 1994 and 2000/1 crises were one-time speculative col-
lapses (temporary) whereas in 2008, the crises are defined as long-term stag-
nation (permanent).
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In managing these three crises, the aim was to exploit remittances as a 
remedy to cushion the negative effects of the crisis on the Turkish economy 
but this consideration did not translate effectively enough into policies.
Comparing the patterns of remittance flows in the post-crisis eras gives 
us hints about the changing motivations of workers in remitting their savings 
in Turkey.
Figure 6 marks the three periods of consecutive crises from 1992 to 2009. 
In the post-1994 period, it is possible to observe a distinct increasing trend in 
the amount of remittance flows to Turkey. However, this trend is dramatically 
changing after the 2000–2001 crisis. The declining trend, which has already 
been observable since 1998, has become even stronger and reached its lowest 
level by the end of 2002. It is difficult to make observations about the post-
2008 crisis period, since it is very recent and its effects are still not completely 
over. However, for the year 2009, we can at least argue that the Turkish econo-
my did not experience any significant increase in the volume of remittances.
Reasons behind this dramatic change in trends are various. Firstly, it can 
be partly explained by the level of migrants’ trust in the future of the Turkish 
economy. Each crisis made the investment motives weaker due to the instabil-
ity and fragility of both banking and real sectors. Secondly, this pattern might 
be further strengthened by a more general shift in the motives to remit from 
altruism to strategic behavior, concerning the second and third generations of 
migrants investing in their own businesses in the host country. In the 1990s, 
Turkish migrants still showed strong family ties with their relatives left in the 
home country  and used to increase the scope of their family support during 
times of economic downturns. Yet in the 2000s, strategic motives seem to pre-
vail over the altruistic ones and since remittances are used to finance invest-
ments, the interest in investing in such an unstable country like Turkey de-
clined. 
Conclusion 
The results of this paper are not only of academic interest but also carry crucial 
policy implications. Looking at the early migration history of Turkey, it is pos-
sible to conclude that Turkey’s approach to the migration issues in the 1960s 
and 1970s were quite positive. In those years, migration had been considered as 
an  opportunity  and  there  was  a  common  belief  that  development  targets 
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might be achieved thanks to labor migration to Europe via an efficient use of 
workers’ remittances. However, there occurred an imbalance between the wills 
and targets and the actual migration policies. Martin (1991) argues that it was 
not until the 1970s that the Turkish state recognized the importance of migra-
tion and began to implement policies about it. However, this recognition coin-
cided  with  the halting  of  the  recruitment  of  foreign workers  (in  Germany) 
from outside of Europe in 1973. In 1983, the “Voluntary Repatriation Encourage-
ment Act” was introduced through which migrants were provided with finan-
cial incentives to return home. Later on, labor migration was accused of failing 
to have positive effects on the Turkish economy. However, the role of the Turk-
ish state in this failure is rarely touched upon in the literature. Taking lessons 
from the past, Turkey ought to implement several policy measures in order to 
pull  the  amount  of  remittance  flows  back to  its  early  1990s  levels. Among 
them, sound economic stability has the priority since, together with a stable 
political atmosphere, it would encourage Turkish workers abroad to invest in 
their home country and plan to return there in the future. Maximization of 
gains from remittances should stand at the core of policy decisions. Maintain-
ing and advancing these gains will be the main policy challenge in the near fu-
ture. A necessity for a shift in perceiving remittances as an external finance for 
the Turkish economy is urgent. 
Put  together, our  analysis  suggests  that  the  decline  in  remittances 
might  be  due to  different  coexisting  reasons. New generations of  migrants 
have weaker ties with Turkey and they are progressively moving from the re-
turn idea to the willingness of settling permanently in the host country and 
investing in their own businesses there. At the same time, the contraction in 
remittance flows after the last two financial crises that hit Turkey in the 2000s 
shows that even if the investment motives could still play a role in determin-
ing remittance behavior, the instability of the Turkish economy and the con-
sequent loss of trustworthiness probably played a key role in negatively influ-
encing migrants’ attitude towards remittances. 
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